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PRIMARY EDUCATION: CHANGING MAINSTAY OF URUGUAY

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Traditionally one of the countries with highest levels of social and human development in Latin America, Uruguay is a small and eminently urban country, with an extended welfare state and universal education. From the beginnings of the twentieth century, education has been one of its main tools for promoting nationality and citizenship.

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The region and Uruguay experimented with different economic development models, switching development models from an Import Substitution Model (ISM) to an export-oriented model. As a result, the second half of the twentieth century entailed a series of changes in the social structures of the country. Poverty and inequality indicators grew and the architecture of the welfare state gradually lost its capacity to respond to a changing structure of social risks (Filgueira et al., 2005). Education was not insulated from these changes.

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In 1995, there is a revolution in the educational public system caused by the reform initiated by the national government. This reform has concentrated most of its strategies on equity in resources (with compensatory emphasis) and has resulted in centralized models that combine focused and universal resources assignment. In primary educational level, Full-Time School model has been its main and more successful tool.¹

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Eleven years after the beginning of the reform, the educational system faces, in terms of its organization, a set of tensions between the traditional structure and the emerging model. The challenges are four: Teachers' stability in schools, degree of autonomy between the school and the central administration, cultural impoverishment of the underprivileged social sectors, and the necessity of basing the expansion of the new model on additional resources. This chapter provides an analysis of the educational system characteristics associated with these four tensions, and a discussion of the most important risks in terms of universalizing the emerging transformation.

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The Public Primary Education and the Twentieth Century

The Principles of Public Education in Uruguay

The principle of equal opportunity in education has been an ideal of Uruguayans since Varela's Reform at the end of the twentieth century.² This reform planned education by taking into account three principles that sought to guarantee equality: *compulsory, secular and free of charge education*. This was in the context of a modernized Uruguay that was characterized by a steady flow of immigrants mostly from Western Europe. As the twentieth century continued, these principles have become dogmas, becoming a constituent aspect of the national culture (Table 1).

The principle of *compulsory education* became a major element in the constitution of Uruguayan nationality since it gave rise to a common language and symbolic universe among immigrants of different nations. Varela's thought was greatly influenced by the thought of the Argentinean Domingo Sarmiento,³ whose civilizing ideal is summarized on his famous dialectical distinction between "civilización y barbarie" (civilization and barbarity). The principle of *free of charge education* sought, along with the compulsoriness, to universalize registration in schools. The State assumes the cost of public education at every level, including university education. Finally, the *principle of secular education* sought to guarantee the hegemonic role of the State in said construction of the national identity. This was the result of repeated and severe confrontations between Catholic Church, State and Masonry.

Early Achievement in Coverage and Arrival of System Crisis

Since Varela's reform, Uruguay has attained a major achievement in terms of education. The illiteracy rate started to decrease steeply, and in the first decades of the twentieth century, the country appeared among the Latin American countries with highest education development. By the middle of 1960s, the 91.6% of population attended primary education, the 23.2% of youths between 12 and 18 years old attended secondary education, and the 1.9% of people older than 18 attended post secondary education. Historically, registration in primary education has been mainly public.⁴ In 2004, the 87.8% of primary education was public, compared with a 12.2% registration in private schools (Table 2).⁵

However, since 1970s, the Uruguayan educational system became threatened by three different factors. These factors attack both the homogenizing goal of the system,

Table 1. Population composition of Uruguay by origin

Year	Uruguayans		Foreigners		Total population
	Population	%	Population	%	
1860	147.557	66	74.849	34	222.406
1908	801.464	83	181.222	17	1.042.686

Source: Juan Rial. Estadísticas históricas del Uruguay (Historical Statistics of Uruguay).

Table 2. Number of schools and registered children

Year	Public		Private	
	Schools	Children	Schools	Children
1868	121	9.201	–	–
1876	196	17.451	225	6.631
1883	303	26.169	423	19.244
1887	366	30.572	441	21.810
1896	533	51.312	379	22.689
1900	571	52.474	344	18.066
1905	619	57.638	301	17.794
1911	793	74.717	300	20.443
1914	997	94.940	219	20.006

Source: Morás, L. "De la Tierra Purpúrea al laboratorio social" (From Purple Land to Social Laboratory).

and its centralized administration. The development of preschool education (education of children of four and five years old), mainly of private initiative, was gradual but determined. This education started to replace the first year of public basic education as the primary, post-familial socialization process of children from most privileged socio-economic sectors.⁶ When private initiative began in preschool education, private schools also started to retain students for the subsequent grades, undercutting the dominance of the public system. This situation enabled the growth of private education, especially for the upper classes that can afford their own education, rejecting the free of charge but lower quality education offered by the State. Furthermore, even when children who have attended private preschool move to public schools, they arrive to first grade with significant advantages over children who have not attended preschool.

Another process unsettling the country and its educational system comes from the double segmentation between schools with favorable contexts and schools with unfavorable contexts.⁷ Given the primary public education covers 86.1% of school population between six and eleven years old in 2000 (see Table 8), the main process that creates inequality is the segmentation in the public system due to the registration in urban school areas that is structured by residential segregation that has intensified in the last decades. Actually, the State effort to universalize basic school attendance triggered, as stated above, a rapid growth of school enrollment since 1960, spurring private initiative but also permitting mass registrations of students. Sectors with higher socio-economic power initiated the search for solutions to the new problem outside the public system.

Both situations contribute to a third threat to public educational system, especially in primary level: increasing territorial segmentation that affects the equity of a registration system based on territory. Public schools start to differentiate from each other in terms of target population and the population starts choosing schools placed in neighborhoods with favorable contexts over those placed in neighborhoods with less favorable contexts. All three, taken together, create a deep segmentation process regarding quality in education, especially in human resources available in the different social contexts. This is

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1X exacerbated by teachers' employment strategies whereby they tend to choose schools
2 with higher socio-cultural levels of students instead of those increasingly impoverished.

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Centralized Administration that Generates Incoherence

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The centralized management of Uruguayan educational system is regulated by the State, mainly through inspection system.⁸ An example of this powerful centralization in public schools is the statutory procedures they must follow. Schools lack their own resources: furniture and materials. Therefore, they have to ask the National Board of Education (ANEP) for the necessary goods. ANEP distributes all materials, be it the needed chalk for the academic year or the books used in different academic subjects.⁹ Even maintenance and necessary repairs including replacement of broken windows, plumbing, carpentry or paintwork have to be done by an official hired by ANEP and assigned to the case; otherwise, money would have to be contributed by the parents' commission or other benefactor.

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In Uruguay, the main sources of inequality in the assignment of school resources are: the political capacity of better schools to obtain more central resources; the possibility of schools to have access to contributions from parent's and parent organizations; and the distribution and movement of teachers and principals across schools of different socio-educational contexts. (Bogliaccini, 2003, 2004; Filgueira & Bogliaccini, 2004; Filgueira & Martínez, 2001; García-Huidobro, 2003; Silveira & Queirolo, 1998). There are important differences in terms of educational equipment videos, library, TV, etc. A basic equipment index made by the technical systems of ANEP shows that 24% of schools in a "very unfavorable" context lack equipment, and only 2% of schools in a "favorable" context are in the same position.

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While this centralizing structure intervenes in every hidden corner of the system, it refuses to directly manage the teachers and principals allocation system. In contrast with the centralizing logic, this allocation is decided, according to statute, by school choice, which establishes teacher autonomy to choose the school of his/her preference and to change at will, within a framework of teaching staff organization that gives priority to those with seniority in the system.

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The teacher and principal allocation system works as follows: every year teachers choose among available positions. Once the total positions are defined, there is an election of teaching hours in every department of the country. If wanted, teachers can register in two different departments for such election. Standards in force stipulate a complex mechanism governed by a "*precedence order by grade in decreasing order*."¹⁰ This mechanism establishes that effective teachers choose before provisional teachers and substitutes, teachers of higher grades choose before those of lower grades and, within each grade, the ones with higher inspection score choose before the ones with lower score. Final distribution of teachers in schools depends on the results of this complex mechanism. Center (district) authorities, principals or parents have no jurisdiction in the matter, except in the case of center authorities, who can suppress, transfer or create positions, at best an indirect mechanism. The only limit to the choices of a teacher are the choices of the others, or more precisely, the choices of those teachers placed in a better position in the "precedence order (Table 3)."

Table 3. Teacher stability in schools of public educational system (1996–2002)

		Public-Montevideo			Public-Interior			Total
		Average	Favorable context	Unfavorable context	Average	Favorable context	Unfavorable context	
New teachers	1996	51.5	40.9	61.4	45.8	37.7	48.3	46.9
	2002	44.2	40.4	53.7	44.2	30.8	47.4	44.2
Stable teachers	1996	10.5	15.9	3.6	25.6	34.4	23.9	22.6
	2002	18.4	14.9	14.7	21.0	26.2	19.5	20.4

• Data to public system originate from the information of urban schools that were included in both surveys. Source: National Learning Census 1996 (UMRE) and Survey of Registration, Teachers and Equipment – General Administration of Planning and Educational Management (2002).

The information that arose from the teacher survey in 1996 and 2002, suggests that the allocation of teachers has a negative bias strongly related to socio-cultural contexts of schools. In general terms, in both years, the percentage of young teachers in schools in “favorable” context is significantly lower than in schools in “unfavorable” ones (IPE-ANEP, 2003a, 2003b/ANEP, 2002). This distortion in allocation is confirmed in all public schools of the country, albeit there is a greater difference in the levels of teachers’ stability depending on the educational center.

In this case, the number of teachers working in the center for less than two years (new teachers) is significantly higher in “unfavorable” contexts rather than “favorable” ones. The system of teacher allocation contributes to the weakening of the identity of the school and its center project because given certain inspection score, the teacher acquires the right to choose the school, and the lack of other incentives lead to a constant rotation of human resources. This mainly affects schools not wanted by teachers, generally those that receive students from income quintiles 1 and 2 (the poorer 40% of Uruguayans). An allocation system that leaves the school election to the teacher, with little restriction or corrective measure, in a context of educational segmentation between schools of different socio-educational levels creates this inequity in teacher quality across the public schools.

The 1990s Decade and the Educational Reform

When democracy returned in 1985, public education was in a state of crisis. Some of the most prominent symptoms of the crisis were: low wages, inappropriate infrastructure, crowded classes and a great number of parents who have chosen to leave the system and look for private alternatives. There were no attempts at structural reforms during the first Sanguinetti administration (1985–1989). The Lacalle administration (1990–1994) developed a system by which some schools of neighborhoods with unfulfilled basic needs (UBN) were defined as schools of “priority care.” Teachers’ wages of those schools rose as a bonus.

In 1995, with the arrival of the second Sanguinetti administration (1995–1999), an ambitious project of reform was launched. It sought to decentralize via class desegregating processes by the improvement of quality in education, through the development of equity

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1X and a higher administrative efficiency. The Batlle Ibáñez administration (2000–2004)
2 continued with the educational policy started in 1995, though with less determination
3X and leadership than the preceding administration. The current Vázquez administration
4 (2005–2009) has not followed a defined policy in terms of education during its first
5 year. It continued with the main lines of reform in primary school education and pro-
6 moted a revision – more political and sectorial than technical – in middle school.

7 During the first five years, reform was planned and conducted by Germán Rama, soci-
8 ologist and professor, who had conducted many studies regarding Uruguayan educa-
9 tional system when working for the CEPAL (Comisión Económica Para América Latina/
10 Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean) in Montevideo, see in par-
11 ticular: Rama (1993). During the 1995 Educational Reform, the administration and the
12 decision making remained centralized. More recently, a discussion has been initiated
13 within education concerning the autonomy of educational centers that could foster insti-
14 tutional strengthening and have a positive impact on educational quality.¹¹

15 First, the reform advanced the first three grades of middle education, in an attempt
16 to recover an institutional dimension that had been lost for more than 25 years. The
17 middle grades had languished due to multiple factors including narrowing of timetable
18 for instruction, overcrowding of schools, and high rotation of teachers. In these terms,
19 the reform aimed to enlarge timetable, reduce repetition levels¹² and search for collec-
20 tive workspaces for the teachers. Furthermore, curriculum was drastically changed
21 through subject regrouping. Training courses for teachers were created to fulfill the
22 new demand, and finally working hours were increased.

23 Second, the reform projected the ambitious plan of expanding public preschool edu-
24 cation, free of charge and compulsory. Preschool education of middle and upper class
25 had grown significantly during the last two decades at private schools, as stated above.
26 Consequently, the State proceeded through a centralist intervention to thwart the logic of
27 preschool expansion headed by private schools, with the purpose of homogenizing the
28 system. The CEPAL's studies from previous years showed the importance of preschool
29 education as one of the determining factors for children's performance during subse-
30 quent years and, therefore, as one of the key ways to reduce inequality in education.

31 In terms of educational resources, the reform aimed and achieved the goal of guaran-
32 teeing that all children of public primary education owned, or had loaned to them, three
33 basic textbooks (math, language and natural sciences), and teachers had their correspon-
34 ding teachers' books. This program of common texts replaced a culture of photocopies
35 of old texts and with supplemental new materials that clearly stratified educational ma-
36 terials in schools with different resources. The expansion of higher wages for those who
37 chose schools with a priority need or in a critical context – as previously defined¹³ – was
38 one of the few initiatives giving direct economic resources to the participants of educa-
39 tional system with the purpose of attenuating the inequitable assignment of human
40 resources.

41 The reform fostered Full Time Schools (ETC)¹⁴ as a measure to focus additional
42 resources on schools within a critical context. The goal was to address more than just
43 education. It attempted to keep children out of the street and instruct teachers in these
44 new schools how to face the learning and adaptation difficulties of children in most
45X “unfavorable” social contexts. Reform developed a system of texts for all the students,
training courses for teachers in schools with critical context and a bonus program for

teachers, material resources and technical support for schools called “*Todos los niños pueden aprender*” (*All children can learn*), with particular emphasis on underprivileged social contexts. The model remains centralized and combines focused strategies with a bias toward underprivileged and universal, public sectors of education (where heterogeneity appears increasingly stratified).

Educational reform emphasized the search for mechanisms to reduce the high repetition percentages in the first grades of primary education. These percentages worked as a regression in terms of equity – children of schools with poorer contexts repeat in a higher percentage – and had not been responsive to educational improvement strategies: universalization of preschool education and preferential assignment of resources to schools with unfavorable contexts.¹⁵ The high repetition rate, likewise, had a direct impact on the over-aged dropout during the first grades of middle education (13–15 years) – once again inhibiting equity.

A standardized system of learning evaluation was created with the purpose of evaluating the reform and as a process to search for initiatives that would better promote equity and quality in education. The system is not a “high stakes” system. Each principal receives the results of the school but they are not public and principals cannot compare them with other schools. The management of the system is under the Unit for the Measurement of Educational Results (UMRE), which tries to boost the educational work of schools with an emphasis on those schools with unfavorable contexts. The combination of standardized measures, teacher professional development courses and the return of results to the school was the strategy chosen by the Uruguayan reform to improve learning and close the educational gap between socio-economic sectors.

Public Expenditure in Education

Although between 1985 and 2004 expenditures on education have been irregular, it has improved patently and with a strong redistributive effort in comparison with the deterioration of previous years. This is particularly true since 1995, when the educational effort of the country considerably increased and an equity bias became the structural axis of educational interventions. Finally, between 1990 and 2000, educational expenditure as a percentage of the GDP grew from 2.4 to 3.4% (of a GDP that also grew between 1990 and 1998 up to an annual accretion of almost 5%). The expenditure by student in preschool, primary and secondary education increased in real terms between 1990 and 2004. During the Vázquez administration, the national Budget law for 2006–2010 approved by National Parliament establishes the goal of reaching an educational expenditure of 4% of the GDP by 2010.

On the other hand, teacher wages have remained practically stagnant. Between 1995 and 1998 teachers wage had a real increase of 5%, but between 1999 and 2000 lost almost the total gain of the previous period (Table 4).

Full Time School: Flagship of the Reform¹⁶

The results of the National Learning Census of 1996 confirmed that social segmentation is reproduced in learning, showing clearly different results according to the context. In “very favorable” contexts, 85% of children reached sufficiency levels in Language

Table 4. Expenditure of primary education board, by large categories. Registration, expenditure by student and expenses by student Rate, 1990=100. Period: 1990–2004

Year	Expenditure			Registration	Expenditure by student	Rate 1990 = 100
	Performance	Investment	Total			
1990	113.8	1.2	115.0	345.344	333	100.0
1995	102.4	3.9	106.3	343.826	309	92.8
1996	126.9	2.5	129.4	356.030	364	109.2
1997	139.4	2.8	142.2	369.500	385	115.6
1998	136.2	5.8	142.0	376.870	377	113.2
1999	149.3	11.0	160.3	383.799	418	125.4
2000	143.2	7.7	150.9	394.400	383	114.9
2001	149.1	8.0	157.1	400.289	392	117.8
2002	141.9	6.8	148.7	403.738	368	110.6
2003	132.4	9.2	141.6	405.653	349	104.8
2004	–	–	146.4	411.534	356	106.9

Source: Based on Furtado and Llambí, 2004. Planning and Budget Administration and Educational Planning Administration of ANEP (National Board of Public Education).

Table 5. Evolution of number of Full Time Schools Period: 1997–2004

Geographic area	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Montevideo	12	18	21	22	22	24
Interior	45	55	65	71	74	78
Total	57	73	90	91	96	102

Source: ANEP – MECAEP.

and the 66% in Math. In “very unfavorable” contexts, the results of sufficiency were 37 and 17%, respectively. From this point of view, the Educational Reform of 1995 constituted the launching pad of the educational initiative that is manifested in Full Time Schools,¹⁷ a response to this increasing segmentation of learning quality. The Reform justifies the Full–Time School model for the unprivileged sectors as a means to achieve a greater equity in the access to knowledge and in the development of competencies and learning (Table 5).¹⁸

In 1992, the first attempts to enlarge the school timetable started in some schools as a pilot plan. In 1996, the first 58 schools, with 9554 attending children, were created or transformed to Full-Time regimen. In 2004, there were 102 schools nationwide working under this regimen, which represents about the 7% of the total school registration in the country (Table 6).

The Full-Time proposal does not end in the extension of the timetable, but it offers a change in the educational schedule. Underprivileged children do not form a homogeneous group. Even though poverty, and its determining factors, have an impact on children with similar disadvantages, its manifestation in the educational needs of students is different. Full-Time Schools try to make up for the differences through actions

Table 6. Primary school registration, from 1st to 6th grade, by school category, by socio-cultural context, urban and rural. Year 2004

	2004	
	Number of students	%
By category		
Normal urban	174.128	56.2
Rural	16.955	5.5
Critical socio-cultural context	46.410	15.0
Full Time	20.326	6.6
Practice	52.101	16.8
National Total	309.920	100.0
Urban according to socio-cultural context		
Very favorable	15.956	5.5
Favorable	39.676	13.6
Average	60.101	20.6
Unfavorable	76.047	26.0
Very unfavorable	101.185	34.6
Urban Total	292.265	100.0

Source: ANEP – MECAEP.

based on affirmative action criteria. Therefore, the school day in such schools includes different institutional/educational schedules allowing differentiated educational strategies. (ANEP, 1997). In general, children attend schools 7 hours a day (35 hours a week), working on activities related to the normal program and activities that complement the central curriculum. These activities are collective, complementary and are developed at classroom level. There are three kinds of complementary activities: activities related to the achievement of languages and physical education, workshop activities and activities oriented to connect with the social environment and the culture. Pedagogical Classroom activities are based on two criteria: start from the experience and culture of the student; and create in the classroom an environment of shared knowledge. *Complementary Time* (3 hours a week) is optional and includes one-on-one assistance and activities intended to engender personal hygiene and the afternoon snack. Finally, the Teachers Meeting (2 hours a week) gives the teachers a time for reflection, elaboration and evaluation.

These Full-Time schools have systematically obtained better results on UMRE tests in terms of sufficiency percentages than the rest of national public schools with the same socio cultural context. Charts 1 and 2 below show this fact, comparing sufficiency percentages of language and math tests in very unfavorable and unfavorable contexts of three school groups, for the years 1996, 1999, and 2002. Schools that worked as Full-Time Schools before 1999, those that did it since or after 1999 and the rest of public schools of the same context. The groups of Full-Time Schools get better results, keeping or widening the initial gap between the groups in 1996 to the/towards year 1999 and 2002, either in language or in math.

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


Chart 1. Languages evolution in Uruguayan public schools. Sufficiency percentage in unfavorable and very unfavorable Contexts
 Source: Study based on ANEP data (2003). National Evaluation of Language and Math Development. 6th grade Primary Education. Second Report. General Administration of Planning and Educational Management. Montevideo.




Chart 2. Math development in public schools. Sufficiency percentage in unfavorable and very unfavorable contexts
 Source: Study based on ANEP data (2003). National Evaluation of Language and Math Development. 6th grade Primary Education. Second Report. General Administration of Planning and Educational Management. Montevideo.

Social Segregation and Educational Segmentation During the 1990s¹⁹

Population distribution in different schools corresponds to many factors. In primary education, the territorial bias in the recruitment of the population is very clear. In societies with high levels of inequality, there are two big sources that generate risks of educational segregation: the territorial recruitment base and the existence of segmented educational offerings in terms of quality and costs. Educational segmentation should be understood as the situation in which the educational experience of the individual tends to be developed and shared essentially with people of the same socioeconomic origin. This segregation is detrimental not only to the constitution of the civic character of the population but also to the learning and educational achievement (ANEP, 2002; Kaztman, 2001; Kaztman & Filgueira, 2001).

The Uruguayan case is a good example of the processes and impacts of the educational segmentation. During the last 20 years, a traditionally equalitarian society with heterogeneous social composition of neighborhoods in Montevideo has presented a growing territorial segregation process. This process has deeply affected the linkage that existed between a hegemonic public educational system and heterogeneous neighborhoods. The result was a socially heterogeneous public school which affected not only early civic experience, but also learning and achievement allowed by the diversity of role models. Nowadays, schools progressively educate homogeneous status groups and the social and human capital is distributed in an increasingly regressive way (Kaztman, 2001) (Table 7).

It is important to emphasize, though, that the above segmentation effects are caused in a context of universal coverage for basic education, with rates of over 95% at the beginning of the decade. Since the improvements in the universal availability of education were achieved in 1990, there has been a change in who attends the public school system. The 1990s were renowned for the return of quintiles 2 and 3 to public schools. In turn, quintile 4 remained without great changes during the decade, however, quintile 5, the highest, returned to private schools. The poorest quintile returned almost 100% to public offerings. Definitely, public system is attractive to middle and low social and economic sectors while the high sectors have moved to private schools (Table 8).

There are two significant causal factors for this shift. First, the return of middle and low sectors to public education could possibly have been caused by the beginning of

Table 7. Population under poverty line (methodology 2002) by age and according to geographical areas of residence. Years 2004 and 2005. Percentages

	0–5 years		6–12 years		13–17 years		18–64 years		65 or more		Total	
	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005	2004	2005
Montevideo	56.6	53.1	57.9	53.5	47.8	47.3	29.4	27.1	11.6	10.6	32.4	30.2
Urban Interior	58.4	55.7	53.2	50.4	44.1	39.5	28.8	25.3	10.0	8.0	32.8	29.5
Whole country	57.6	54.5	55.3	51.7	45.9	43.1	29.1	26.2	10.8	9.4	32.6	29.8

Source: Statistics National Institute (2006): "Press Communication, Homes Constant Poll, Poverty Effect in 2005," Montevideo, April 5th, <http://www.ine.gub.uy/>

Table 8. Uruguay 1991–2000: Attendance percentage of children from 6 to 11 years old to public educational system, according to income

Income quintiles	1991	2000	1991–2000
	Public	Public	Balance
Quintile 1	93.7	98.0	4.3
Quintile 2	84.1	91.1	7.0
Quintile 3	71.6	79.8	8.2
Quintile 4	60.5	61.0	0.5
Quintile 5	46.0	39.2	–6.8
Total	81.3	86.1	4.8

Source: Own study based on Household Constant Survey (ECH).

problems that the job market experienced since 1994 and the later recession and economical crisis that started in 1998. Free public education may have been simply more affordable, compared to costs of private education. Another possible cause may be that the educational reform made the public schools more attractive to middle sectors given the additional quality of primary education, especially in critical contexts. Therefore, new Full-Time Schools could have attracted the attention of the population residing in those neighborhoods instead of the private offer. (Filgueira & Bogliaccini, 2004).

Quintile 5, the most privileged sector, had moved to private education, probably due to lack of attention to reform the best public schools and possibly the deterioration of these offerings, which attracts the richest sectors of the population. The very emphasis in achieving equity levels focused on those vulnerable sectors may have created, as a secondary effect, this change in preferences for those who can afford a private institution. However, in general terms, public offerings overcame the private ones during the decade resulting in an increasing registration in public schools before this later segmentation process. This is a similar situation to the one experienced for preschool education, although in this case there were trying to achieve a goal of expanding the coverage like in middle education. Thus, Uruguay throughout the 1990s created mechanisms that improved the equity among middle and low sectors but drove high sectors from public education to private offerings (Filgueira & Bogliaccini, 2004).

Development Tensions that Cause Change Alternatives

Full-Time School model has fostered the development of alternatives in the ways of organizing and working in a school. The traditionally homogenous system used the same methods and processes for all students regular (but heterogeneous) urban school. Now schools and centers are able to differentiate their educational offerings according to the needs of the student population. All these changes become part of the school's identity and open the door to more widespread innovation (ANEP, 2003b).

All Full-Time Schools (ETCs) form a differentiated universe from the traditionally regular urban schools. Some ETCs have created favorable settings to innovations and

changes. However, this policy now faces different tensions that will affect its future, determining its integration with the rest of the educational system. It may be that Full-Time Schools will become the dominant model or the traditional model may overcome the full-time model in a slow stagnating process.

There are four main tensions between this new emerging model and the traditional model of regular urban schools, in order to improve quality and equity in this educational proposal:²⁰ (1) managing teacher stability in schools, (2) the degree of autonomy between central administration and school, (3) dealing with cultural differentiation tied to social segregation process, and (4) the economic costs of universalizing the Full-Time model and of constant training of teachers.

Teacher Stability in Schools

Innovation, and its capacity to take advantage of the environment in which operates, depends on the stability of a set of key processes of the school. This stability also depends essentially on the school staff's stability. This stability is a necessary condition, (but not fully sufficient), to positively impact the quality of education. Stability and innovation have a fragile link in that the change phenomenon operates as both opportunity and risk. (Argyris & Schön, 1978). This stability is a key factor when it comes to improving the relationship between teachers, developing constructive relationships with the neighborhood and with students' families, elaborating an institutional project with long-term goals, and achieving a complete knowledge of the organization that allows a change from reactive problem-solving to having a medium-term planning capability. Stability of staff establishes a better setting for education, and is an attractive setting to parents. It is necessary to consider this not only as a virtue in its own right, but also as an essential condition to achieve a qualitative change in the performance of the educational system as a whole (Bogliaccini, 2004; Frigerio & Poggi, 1992; García-Huidobro, 2003; Silveira & Queirolo, 1998).

However, teacher stability is the least where equity is the most needed outcome, since most teacher rotation to other schools comes schools with students of low socio-economic status or with an "unfavorable socio-cultural context" (see Table 2). This is allowed by the normal mechanism of teachers' allocation to schools. In Full-Time Schools, teachers' mobility is lower than in the rest of the system, due to the inclusion of *ad hoc* regulations from ANEP and also due to the number of this type of schools. Once the teacher chooses a Full-Time School, (s)he often wishes not to go back to regular schools, and probably would not have the chance to, as there are few available vacancies. However, the allocation method is the same that works for the rest of the public system, which makes a good reason to assume that with a fuller expansion of the Full-Time School model, the same defects that presently affect regular urban schools would be copied permitting considerable teacher mobility and therefore little stability in schools, possibly working against equity once more.

Nowadays, in a setting of expansion of the new model, teacher stability in Full-Time Schools is extremely fragile, and depends on two factors that could disappear in such settings, all other things being equal. First, it is unlikely that a procedure of exceptional

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1X job allocation would survive an expansion of the model unless there is a negotiation
 2 with the teachers' union and a change in the Teachers Statute. On the other hand, the
 3X affective and personal acknowledgement caused by working in the "flagship" of the sys-
 4 tem is softened when the same "renovates the fleet." Second, the weak point of the cur-
 5 rent model lies in the fact that individual or corporate interests have replaced collective
 6 interests when allocating teachers to schools, without prioritizing affirmative action for
 7 the good of the students.²¹ Moreover, this weak point has an attractive characteristic that
 8 should be taken into account when negotiating alternatives, which is to allow teachers to
 9 choose his/her workplace.

11 *Degree of Autonomy Between Schools and ANEP*

13 The strong centralization of the national educational system has started to manifest
 14 signs of inadequacy in the management of the new model and this represents a chal-
 15 lenge to its authorities. Hypothetically, greater autonomy to schools opens a door to
 16 diversity and allows schools to use their creativity to respond in a better way to their
 17 own context. Full-Time Schools model constitutes a better setting to achieve an insti-
 18 tutional project than the regular urban school, mainly because of the new structure,
 19 there is time available for coordination and a stronger relationship between teachers.
 20 A consequence of this is teachers' expectations regarding roles and attributions of the
 21 principal and the inspector. A stronger school claims more autonomy (Bogliaccini,
 22 2004; Lijtenstein & Bogliaccini, 2004).

23 The principal's role, a key actor in the ANEP, has faced changes in Full-Time Schools
 24 with respect to professional practice compared to the previous model (Bogliaccini,
 25 2003). Full-Time Schools and their dynamics have caused stronger relations between
 26 teachers and has increased teamwork, all of which implies a different evaluation process
 27 and a redefinition of principal leadership. Among teachers, there appears to be a tension
 28 between traditional management based on administrative facts and the new manage-
 29 ment that evidenced a pedagogical leadership (typical of Full-Time Schools).

30 The difficult relation between principals and inspectors appears mainly in schools
 31 that have created stable groups of teachers, based on a successful pedagogical center
 32 project. (Bogliaccini, 2004). However, in a gradual expansion process of Full-Time
 33 Schools model, less successful centers probably still need the inspector figure, but a
 34 kind of inspector similar to a pedagogical leader instead of a supervisor. The challenge
 35 is then to improve strategies to make the model more flexible in terms of schools'
 36 autonomy, instead of keeping a system of non-differentiated universal rules.

38 *Cultural Impoverishment in Settings of Residential Segregation*

40 This tension extends throughout the whole educational system but mainly affects those
 41 schools with unfavorable and very unfavorable contexts. Full-Time Schools are specifi-
 42 cally located in areas of the country with these kinds of socio-cultural contexts. In
 43 general terms, parents of students attending these schools have achieved a low educa-
 44 tional level and their relation with job market is unstable, informal and transitory.
 45X These neighborhood communities are generally caused by interurban migration as a

consequence of social segregation processes (Katzman, 2001) and that is why they progressively become poorer communities. These families constitute the population group with socially vulnerable conditions, affected or threatened by poverty and subject to exclusion processes of social institutions and more high status groups (Katzman & Filgueira, 2001). Moreover, this group also constitutes the majority of students. In Uruguay, 51.7% of children between 6 and 12 years old are under poverty line.

This cultural differentiation²² shows a new geography of an increasingly segmented educational system. Although it would not be reasonable to expect to remedy social segregation only with the educational system, the Full-Time Schools model is proving to be a successful affirmative action instrument for providing better assistance to the poorest social sectors. School buildings located in these neighborhoods are an exception to the impoverished context morphology: new, firm, spacious buildings located on large pieces of land establish the affirmative intention of the State. From teachers' perspective, violence in human relations is one of the main differentiated aspects in school and neighborhood culture (Bogliaccini, 2005). Schools, in that sense, should not give up the goal of becoming something different: a socializing environment that unifies rules that permit a better integration of the child to society. Nevertheless, the question remains about how to deal with behavior codes that vary from one culture to another. Those opposed to each other clearly present the greatest challenge in terms of integration with the social mainstream (Bogliaccini, 2005; Katzman, 1999, 2001; Katzman & Filgueira, 2001; Kessler, 2004) (Figure 1).

While a difficult challenge, the educational system should be trying to lessen the tension between the increasingly differentiated universes of schools and neighborhoods in Uruguay, moving forward to formulate new strategies to relate with students' families. The school's capability to approach its work from an innovative perspective depends on the proper organization of the human relations between teachers and students' families.




Figure 1. Teachers' symbolic perception of children's universe of interaction (Bogliaccini, 2005)

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Resources and Policies to Universalize the Full-time Schools Model

Probably the major lesson of these first years of Full-Time Schools model operation is that affirmative action works out. As Chart 3 shows, the schools that receive children from unfavorable and very unfavorable socio-cultural contexts have attained similar or even higher percentages of sufficiency than the average of the rest of the public educational system, which have children from all social strata. However, this model has worked with an intensive investment not only in furniture and building resources, but also in permanent costs as food, educational and technological resources, wages of special teachers, reduction of number of students by grade and even the wages of regular teachers. In this sense, if the model's intent is to extend its coverage towards a more significant proportion of the full student registration, a proportionate rise in the expenditure as well as an inclusion of the same in the national educational budget, will be necessary. If the model spreads out without the appropriate economic resources, there is a high probability that what is being implemented will be distorted and possibly not be able to deliver on what the pilot schools have so far produced (Table 9).

The success of this model, as a policy of affirmative action, compels the country to generate a progressive policy for its expansion, starting from the creation of a decennial plan of incorporation of schools to the model, while necessary corrective measures are studied to promote those characteristics that make it successful. Along with this issue, there appears another challenge for a successful model in a low proportion




Chart 3. Language and Math development in Uruguayan public schools. Compared sufficiency percentage between national average and Full-Time Schools (ETCs) according to context
 Source: Study based on ANEP data (2003a, 2003b). National Evaluation of Language and Math Development. 6th grade Primary Education 2002. Second Report. General Administration of Planning and Educational Management. Montevideo.

Table 9. Funds spent by ANEP on primary education (1995–2002), according to type of expenditure dollars – year 2002

Year	Total expenditure	Performance expenditure	Investment expenditure
1995	101,942,307	92,243,338	3,698,918
1996	124,139,618	121,735,380	2,404,239
1997	136,418,354	133,730,827	2,687,527
1998	153,632,516	148,458,302	5,174,214
1999	165,642,748	161,609,629	4,033,119
2000	160,909,460	156,655,574	4,253,886
2001	170,007,147	165,673,381	4,333,767
2002	152,638,518	152,074,362	564,156

Source: Statistics Department of Programming and Budget General Administration of CODICEN. Based on balances of budget execution of ANEP.

of national registration confronted with the growth tensions of a national universalization priority: to design teacher stability and coverage strategies that mimic the patterns of the teachers who started in 1995.

Summarizing, the proper resolution of the four identified tensions opens the door to the stabilization of the new model, positioning it as the *flagship* of institutional change, which should be the template for change in the entire primary education system for decades to come.

Notes

1. To learn more about the Uruguayan Full Time School Model, check Administración Nacional de Educación Pública (National Board of Public Education – ANEP) (1997) “*Propuesta pedagógica para las escuelas de Tiempo Completo*” [Pedagogical Proposal to Full-Time Schools]. MECAEP – ANEP – BIRF Project. Uruguay.
2. José Pedro Varela, who published his first pedagogical work: “La educación del pueblo” [The Education of the People] in 1874 and “La legislación escolar” [School Legislation] in 1876, was commissioned by the President Gral. Lorenzo Latorre to elaborate the basis of a national educational system in 1876. Varela has become a symbol of Uruguayan culture and education. To learn more about Varela’s work, see: Demarchi, M., and Rodríguez, H. (2000). *José Pedro Varela (1845–1879)*. Perspectives: revue trimestrielle d’éducation comparée. Bureau international d’éducation, Vol. XXIV, no. 3/4, 1994 (91/92) pp. 733–749. Paris: UNESCO.
3. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento had significant influence on Varela’s thought. Varela met him during his travels to the United States and the two established a rich epistolary exchange. “Facundo,” written in 1851 reflects Sarmiento’s thought. Sarmiento, D. (1967). *Facundo. Civilización y barbarie* [Civilization and Barbarity]. Argentina: Colección Austral.
4. In Uruguay, the State does not take part in the funding of private, primary educational schools. The dominant structure is hegemonically public, with 87.7% of coverage entrusted to the State. See percentages of participation in public and private education by income quintile in Table 8 below. However, the experience of “Care Centers for Children and Family” (CAIF) constitutes a successful national experience of public funding and private management. CAIF offers comprehensive care for children up to four years old, from low economic and cultural contexts (Filgueira & Bogliaccini, 2004).
5. Data from the Educational Statistics Department, ANEP.
6. Concerning the results of the expansion of public preschool education offer since educational reform of 1995, see Filgueira and Bogliaccini, 2004.

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7. The National Learning Census, conducted by UMRE in 1996 for the sixth grade of public and private schools nationwide, had five categories of socio-cultural context defined by two indicators: educational level of the mother and resources in the home. Groups were denoted as “very favorable,” “favorable,” “middle,” “unfavorable,” and “very unfavorable.”
 8. The inspectorate is the main formal communication channel between the school and the main office of the system, as well as with other public or private schools. Inspectors are selected through public examination from those school principals who want to run for the post. Inspectors assess teachers and principals of a certain number of schools appointed by territorial areas, and they watch over the proper functioning of the schools in his/her care, on behalf of the educational system. Likewise, the inspector is the channel by which school communicates with the main office and vice versa, however, ANEP uses, as well, the circular letter system to send direct and general messages to schools.
 9. This was a part of a program promoted by the 1995 Reform in order to give every student of the public system access to the academically necessary supplies.
 10. See the *Statute of Teachers*, particularly articles 13 and 14. This same mechanism appears in the regulations of Decentralized Boards.
 11. The only initiative promoting school autonomy is the so-called Projects of Educational Improvement (PME), designed to promote the elaboration of distinct school identities. Projects of diverse kind compete for funds that ANEP assigns to the execution of winning PMEs.
 12. This includes reducing low attendance through administrative methods because low attendance was a major factor in repeating grades in junior high school (12–14 years old, 1st to 3rd grade of middle school).
 13. Nowadays these schools are called: Schools with Critical Socio-Cultural Contexts (SCCC).
 14. Full-Time Schools (ETCs) were created in Resolution No. 21 of Record 90, December 24, 1998, Central Directive Board This resolution was put in force in 1999.
 15. To study the problem of grade repetition in Uruguay read ANEP (2002) *La repetición en la escuela pública en cifras [Repetition in Public School in Figures]*. Statistics Series No. 3. General Administration of Planning and Educational Management. Montevideo. This work, conducted by C. Filgueira, constitutes an excellent analysis of this situation.
 16. For more information regarding Full-Time Schools, the National Board of Public Education (ANEP) has the main documents of this educational proposal available at: www.mecaep.com.uy
 17. Resolution No 21 of Record 90, December 24, 1998. Central Directive Board (CODICEN) of ANEP. This resolution was put in force in 1999.
 18. “The concept of a new primary education universality lies in the fact that it is not enough to guarantee the access and permanency; the actual transformation is related to the democratization of the access to knowledge.” Program – Five-year Budget of ANEP. 1995–1999.
 19. To analyze social and residential segregation, see the works of R. Katzman within the framework of the Program of Research on Exclusion, Poverty and Social Exclusion of the Catholic University of Uruguay. (www.ucu.edu.uy/ipes/publicaciones)
 20. The analysis of the author is directly supported by two researches accomplished within the framework of the evaluation of Full-Time model (Bogliaccini, 2005; Lijtenstein & Bogliaccini, 2004).
 21. To study the concept of affirmative action, read Reimers, F. (2000). *Unequal schools, unequal chances*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. USA.
 22. To study the concept of cultural differentiation and its impact on the education, see Reimers, F. (2000). *Unequal schools, Unequal chances*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. USA.

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