

# Unpacking redistributive preferences in Latin America

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## **Abstract**

Recent work on developed countries has explored whether the notion of preferences for redistribution can be conceptualized as bi-dimensional. Our work picks up on these innovative studies to analyze whether bi-dimensionality may be important to understanding the puzzling structure of redistributive preferences in four Latin America countries (Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay).

Results from exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis suggest that, in line with previous findings for the developed world, two dimensions of redistributive preferences—‘self-interest’ and ‘other-regarding’ attitudes—are present in Uruguay and Costa Rica. However, they are not observable in the cases of Chile and Colombia.

In contrast to what other studies have found, income is not always relevant to shape both self-interest and other-regarding support. Also, different variables are relevant in each country to differentiate between types.

Our attempt to empirically test a more refined conceptualization for the notion of redistributive preferences provides new insights both to understand the Latin American puzzle regarding support for redistribution and to the comparative literature on the topic.

**Keywords:** redistributive preferences, self-interest, ‘other-regarding’ attitudes, Latin America

## 1. Introduction

Preferences for redistribution in Latin America do not seem to behave as predicted by classic political economy theories. In contrast to what prior research has shown for the developed world<sup>1</sup>, several studies have shown that support for redistribution in the region is not necessarily shaped by self-interested motivations based on income (Cramer & Kaufman, 2011; Kaufman, 2009; Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Blofield & Luna 2011; Holland, 2018; Bogliaccini & Luna 2019)<sup>2</sup>. In fact, in Latin America the poor are not more supportive of redistributive policies than the non-poor and the rich are not always aligned against redistribution (Blofield & Luna 2011; Holland, 2018; Bogliaccini & Luna 2019).

The literature has provided several answers to this Latin American puzzle. One set of arguments is that individuals' perceptions about their positions in the income distribution, as well as their expectations about the extent to which they will benefit from increased redistribution, are more important than their actual incomes. In highly unequal societies like most Latin American ones, the poor's expectations about their opportunities to enjoy welfare benefits tend to be lower (Holland, 2018). In line with this idea, it has been argued that preferences for redistribution in the region are mostly shaped by different inequality cleavages (Morgan & Kelly, 2016), as well as by the different perceptions built from being an insider (formal worker) or an outsider (informal worker) in the labor market (Berens, 2015; Carnes & Mares, 2015, 2016; Menéndez, 2018). Another group of explanations, coming from the institutionalist tradition, proposes that individuals' preferences for redistribution are directly linked to trust in public services (Berens, 2015; Chen, 2016). In countries with weak

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<sup>1</sup> For a review of this literature see Dion & Birchfield, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> It is fair to mention that some studies do find the expected negative relationship between income and support for redistribution in the region. See for example Gaviria, Graham, & Braido, 2007.

policy implementation and low state capacity (Centeno, 2002; Mares, 2005; Soifer, 2013; Kurtz, 2015), support for redistribution will be low, regardless of individual income or social class membership. A variation of this argument even proposes that corruption and clientelism tend to reduce demands for universal social policy (Haggard & Kaufman; Morgan & Kelly, 2010). These arguments lead to the prediction that Latin Americans –and particularly the poor, the excluded and/or the labor market’s outsiders- do not support redistribution because they either fail to see it as something that would ever benefit them directly or they believe the state is not capable or willing to redistribute.

In this paper we introduce a complementary explanation to the Latin American puzzle. We contend that most of the research in the region is based on a blurred concept of support for redistribution, measured through indicators that conflate different concerns and ideas. More specifically, we draw from recent research that identifies not only a self-interest interpretation but also an other-regarding dimension to redistributive preferences. We argue that the mixed results of redistributive preferences in the region could be partially explained when they are conceptualized and measured in bi-dimensional terms.

Using the 2012 Barometer of the Americas database in four countries for which we have enough data—Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile and Uruguay—we attempt to unpack redistributive preferences by testing for the presence of both the classic self-interest dimension as well as an ‘other-regarding’ component.

We find that in Uruguay and Costa Rica support for redistribution has two facets: support led by self-interest and support resulting from ‘other-regarding’ attitudes. By contrast, in Chile and Colombia, these facets are not present and support for redistribution seems to be one-dimensional.

We also find that while in Uruguay both self-interest and other-regarding oriented preferences are stratified by income, in Costa Rica income does not seem to be shaping either ‘self-interest’ or ‘other-regarding’ support for redistribution.

Finally, based on the idea that support for redistribution is bi-dimensional, we build a typology with four different types of preferences that could be present at the individual level. We empirically explore their characteristics in Uruguay and Costa Rica by identifying the main variables that are relevant to determine whether individuals are in one group or the others.

We find that sex, religiosity and education are important to distinguish between types in Costa Rica. In Uruguay, by contrast, the relevant variables are education, income, ideology and evaluation of the economy.

Our effort to empirically test a refined concept of redistributive preferences provides new insights to explain why the self-interest hypothesis does not perform as expected in the region.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section contains a brief review of the existing literature on support for redistribution, focused on the role played both by the self-interest perspective as well as by ‘other-regarding’ preferences. Then, we present our argument and hypothesis. In section three, we describe methods and data used and synthesize the main features of redistributive preferences in our four countries. Lastly, we present and discuss our main findings.

## **2. A bi-dimensional approach to preferences for redistribution in Latin America**

Conventional political economy theories explain support for redistributive policies as the result of self-interested behavior based on individual income (Meltzer & Richard, 1981). The bulk of the literature developed under the Meltzer and Richard model refers to preferences for redistribution as the classic notion of taxing the rich, capturing the idea of support for redistribution through the material ‘self-interest’ income maximization of individuals. From

this perspective, high income individuals will try to avoid redistribution because they are net payers, while low income people will push for more redistribution, since they are net beneficiaries (Meltzer & Richard, 1981; Alesina & Glaeser, 2004; Iversen & Soskice, 2001; Iversen & Soskice, 2009; Kenworthy & McCall, 2007).

However, recent works contend that support for redistribution is a rather complex concept that may be conflating more than one dimension of people's attitudes (Fong, 2001; Rueda & Pontusson, 2010; Cavaillé & Trump, 2015; Rueda, 2018). These studies posit that are grounded not only in 'self-interest', but also in the consideration of 'other-regarding' attitudes (Fong, 2001; Rueda & Pontusson, 2010; Cavaillé & Trump, 2015; Rueda, 2018).

The most common concept that the literature uses to capture 'other-regarding' is related to values of solidarity and social affinity (Lupu & Pontusson, 2011; Cavaillé & Trump, 2015, Dimick, Rueda, & Stegmueller, 2017), altruism (Dimick et al., 2017; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006; Rueda, 2018)<sup>3</sup> or inequity aversion (Höchtel, Sausgruber, & Tyran, 2012)<sup>4</sup>. When relating these ideas to redistributive preferences, most scholars refer to them as an important motivation to support redistribution that can operate in combination with the individual utility of own material gains. In sum, these studies integrate 'other-regarding' preferences to explain why support for redistribution doesn't not fully fit with the classic 'self-interest' approach based on short-term income maximization. Rueda & Pontusson (2010), for example, show that preferences for redistribution among the poor are only shaped by material self-interest, but altruistic concerns become more important among the rich. This idea is fully developed by Dimick et al. (2017) who show that changes in aggregate inequality

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<sup>3</sup> Cavaillé & Trump look at these two dimensions and name them as 'redistribution from', illustrated by the question 'Will I benefit?' and 'redistribution to', illustrated by the question 'Who are the others who will benefit and how do I feel about them?' (Cavaillé & Trump, 2015).

<sup>4</sup> This idea differs from that of unconditional kindness, since there is a utility gain to the individual in increasing the allocation of resources to others or reducing overall inequality (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006)

play an important role in shaping support for redistribution, and that the rich are more responsive to these changes than the poor.

While this literature provides interesting insights, it has been argued that it often considers both ‘self-interest’ and ‘other-regarding’ preferences as part of a unidimensional concept. However, recent studies claim for the need of new conceptualization that considers these two elements as different streams. On one hand, there are ‘self-interested’ preferences based on the idea of ‘taking from the rich’ and, on the other, there is support to the idea of ‘giving to the poor’ (Cavaillé & Trump, 2015). These two dimensions might lead to different (even opposite) predictions about support for redistribution (Cavaillé & Trump, 2015), because individuals might not be willing to take from the rich but, at the same time, might be open to giving to the poor, or vice versa. Also, the drivers behind self-interest oriented support for redistribution might not be the same as those underlying ‘other-regarding’ oriented support (Rueda & Pontusson, 2010; Cavaillé & Trump, 2015).

Recent attempts to test the empirical grounds of the two-faceted structure of support for redistribution in developed countries fit closely to the notions of self-interest and other-regarding attitudes described in theoretical terms (Cavaillé & Trump, 2015).<sup>5</sup> However, this exploration has focused more on aggregate configurations at the country level than on how these two dimensions of redistributive preferences combine at the individual level.

Against this backdrop, we take this idea of bi-dimensionality as a starting point to theorize about how different combinations of these two facets produce different types of redistributive preferences.

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<sup>5</sup> In their empirical test for four European countries, Cavaillé & Trump also find a third factor, identified as ‘government’, but this is highly correlated with their ‘redistribution from’ factor (Cavaillé & Trump, 2015).

A bi-dimensional structure means that self-interest attitudes vary independently from other-regarding attitudes. If bi-dimensionality is found, we assume that the combination of these two dimensions should produce four types of citizens (figure 1). First, there could be citizens that are not willing to redistribute by paying more taxes and, at the same time, are not willing to support governments' efforts to help the poor. We name this group 'libertarians'. Second, we could find individuals (we call them 'Egoistic') that are willing to pay more taxes but do not consider relevant to increase the poor's welfare. Third, there could be individuals that can be sympathetic to the poor even when not being willing to pay for the redistributive outcome. We call this group 'naïve egalitarians'. Finally, there could be citizens that are both willing to pay more taxes and help the poor at the same time. We identify this group as 'egalitarian'.



**Figure 1. Typology of redistributive preferences**

		Other regarding support for redistribution	
		Low	High
Self-interested support for redistribution	Low	Libertarian	Naïve egalitarian
	High	Egoistic	Egalitarian

*Assessing bi-dimensionality in LA*

Studies seeking to describe and explain support for redistribution in the region are using different and varied measures to test their hypotheses (see table A.1 in the appendix). While some equate support for redistribution with the idea that incomes should be made more equal (Blofield & Luna, 2011b), others relate it to the role governments should have in reducing income inequality (Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Morgan & Kelly, 2017; Holland, 2018), and still others to the idea that governments should have an important role in providing for everyone (Berens, 2015). Redistributive preferences are also linked to the willingness to pay higher taxes when resources are spent on social policies (Bogliaccini & Luna, 2019), or to the evaluation of the government performance in reducing poverty (Alesina & Giuliano, 2009), or to the perceived state role in delivering services (Carnes & Mares, 2016), or even to a more general evaluation of the fairness of actual income distributions (Cramer & Kaufman, 2011; da Fonseca Silva & de Figueiredo, 2013; Roberts, 2012).

In this paper We argue that most studies are based on a blurred concept that is being measured through indicators that conflate both self-interest and other-regarding attitudes. We take the idea of bi-dimensionality as a starting point to claim that these varied ways to conceptualize and measure support for redistribution could be relevant to explain why redistributive preferences are not aligned with self-interest predictions.

### 3. Methods & data

As mentioned before, our first goal is to empirically test bi-dimensionality in individual preferences towards redistribution in Latin American. Our guiding hypothesis posits that *Support for redistribution is not unidimensional but bi-dimensional. Where we find bi-dimensionality we expect to find self-interest and other-regarding preferences.*

To test bi-dimensionality, we work with data from the Americas Barometer-Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP 2012). We base on the measures used in prior work in the region and then selected a wide array of questions that have been or can be used to measure support for redistribution. We then ‘theoretically’ classified them into self-interest or other-regarding attitudes (Table 1).

**Table 1. Questions measuring two facets of support for redistribution**

Dimension		Question	Categories
Self-interested support for redistribution	1	Willingness to pay more taxes if were used to support those who have less (td5)	Varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being the lowest willingness to pay more taxes and 7 the highest
	2	The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor (ros4)	Varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being complete disagreement with the statement and 7 complete agreement
	3	For each 100 (local currency) a rich and a poor person make, how much should each pay in taxes? (soc1r)	Varies from 0 to 2, with 0 being the answer “the rich should pay 30 and the poor 30”, 1 “the rich

Dimension		Question	Categories
			should pay 40 and the poor 30”, and 2 “The rich should pay 50 and the poor 20”;
	4	Social policies support (socialpolicy)	Varies from 0 to 3, with 0 being less support for social policy expenditure and 3 more support for social policy
Other-regarding support for redistribution	5	Inequality is a good thing because it makes poor people work harder (td2)	Varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being complete disagreement with the statement and 7 complete agreement
	6	People who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy (cct3)	Varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being complete disagreement with the statement and 7 complete agreement
	7	Government's effort in reducing poverty (n1)	Varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being complete disagreement with the statement and 7 complete agreement
	8	There has always been rich and poor people and that can't be changed (td1)	Varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being complete disagreement with the statement and 7 complete agreement

Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 questionnaire for Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay.

We defined questions 1 to 4 as items that capture mainly self-interest oriented redistributive preferences, since they either lead individuals to think about themselves as beneficiaries or payers, through taxes, of social policies (item 1, 3 and 4) or they explicitly mention the importance of government policies in reducing income inequality between the rich and the poor (item 2). We then identified questions 5 to 8 as items mirroring other-regarding oriented redistributive preferences. Items 5 and 6 capture attitudes towards the poor, item 7 measures people’s evaluation of how their government is performing in reducing poverty, and item 8 poses a more abstract statement on the naturalized differences between the rich and the poor. We propose that all of them, in some way or another, prime individuals

to think of themselves as a contributor to social policies that benefit others or provide an opinion about those that could directly benefit from their contribution.

Unfortunately, all 8 questions are only available in four countries -Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay-, so we decided to work only with these cases. Table A.2 in the appendix shows descriptive statistics for the four cases.

To test our bi-dimensionality hypothesis, we explore whether these eight items load into a one-dimensional notion of distributive preferences or, as we expect, are capturing two facets of redistributive preferences. Following similar exercises done for developed countries (Cavaillé & Trump, 2015), we use Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in order to construct an explicit model of the factor structure and statistically test its fit (Matsunaga 2010). Our CFA restricts the factor loadings to two dimensions—self-interest and other-regarding—in the four countries. Our sample allows a ratio between observations and factors of more than 100:1.

We run an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) for any of the four cases for which we cannot confirm the two expected facets, in order to assess whether the underlying structure of the notion is nevertheless bi-dimensional. A Parallel Analysis then confirms EFA results with regard to the number of retained factors, and a subsequent CFA is run for the(se) factor(s) in order to validate the newfound factor structure.

Our EFA analysis, given that our items are measured on an ordinal scale, uses a polychoric correlation matrix. Factors are extracted using Principal Components Factor method followed by an Oblique Promax rotation, because we assume that factors regarding preferences for redistribution may be correlated. However, results are robust to Orthogonal Varimax rotation.

We then move to our second goal, which is to explore whether they are shaped by income, what configurations in terms of types of citizens are present and what variables are relevant to explain them.

To do this, we compute individual scores<sup>6</sup> on the facets found for each country, rescaling the factors to 0–1, with 1 denoting the responses that are more favorable to redistribution and 0 the responses that are less favorable to redistribution.

We use factor scores in an analysis of variance (ANOVA) with income levels. We then classify individuals according to the four types we defined (libertarian, egoistic, naïve egalitarian, egalitarian) by cutting the distributions in two at their mean values. We finally develop a comparative analysis of the characteristics of the individuals belonging to each type using multinomial logit models. This allows us to observe the effect of each regressor on the relationship between two specific categories, instead of assuming a linear relationship with a single parameter and an average effect for the four categories in the data center (Long, 1997; Gelman and Hill 2007). The interpretation of the results is based on the analysis of the relative probability of change between two categories of the dependent variable given a change of one unit in the independent variable, leaving the rest of the variables constant in their average values:  $\exp(\beta_m | n)$  (Gujarati, 2004; Gelman & Hill, 2007).

We use a selection of independent variables based on what other studies have shown as relevant determinants of support for redistribution, such as income, education level, sex, age (Cusack, Iversen, & Rehm, 2006; Finseraas, 2009; Gaviria, Graham, & Braido, 2007), ideology, position in the labor market, race (Morgan & Kelly, 2017), religion (De La O & Rodden, 2008) and country economic perception (Blofield & Luna, 2011b; Gaviria et al., 2007; Morgan & Kelly, 2017) (Table A.3 in appendix).

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<sup>6</sup> Factor scores are linear combinations of the observed variables which consider what is shared between the item and the factor (i.e., shared variance) and what is not measured (i.e., the uniqueness or error term variance). Overall, the factor scores created through CFA under a regression approach can be used to identify ranking on a latent variable and used in follow-up analyses (DiStefano et al. 2009).

#### 4. Facets of redistributive preferences in four Latin American countries

*Is support for redistribution bi-dimensional in Latin America?*

Our empirical analysis shows partial support for the two proposed facets as stated in our hypothesis. Evidence supports the existence of a two-dimensional notion of redistributive preferences in Costa Rica and Uruguay. As shown in table 2, in both countries, items 1, 2 and 4 (and in the case of Uruguay, also item 3) are significantly related to a factor that refers to a self-interest orientation on redistribution, while items 5, 6 and 8 are associated in both countries with a factor that captures other-regarding attitudes. The models fit the data adequately, as shown by a Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and a Comparative Fit Index (CFI). Correlation coefficients between the two factors (facets) are very low (0.0328 in Costa Rica and  $-0.0265$  in Uruguay). Histograms of the four factors are presented in figures A.3-A.6 in appendix).

**Table 2. CFA for Costa Rica and Uruguay**

	Costa Rica		Uruguay	
	Sel-interest	Other-regarding	Sel-interest	Other-regarding
1 Willingness to pay more taxes if were used to support those who have less	0.87***		0.68***	
2 The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor	0.26***		0.29***	
3 For each 100 (local currency) a rich and a poor person make, how much should each pay in taxes?	0.07		0.12***	
4 Support for Social Policies	0.53***		0.61***	
5 Inequality is a good thing because it makes poor people work harder		0.89***		0.64***
6 People who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy		0.17**		0.26***
7 Government's effort in reducing poverty		0.01		0.00
8 The has always been rich and poor people and that can't be changed		0.32***		0.61***
Correlation coefficient between factors:		0.0328		$-0.0265$

Cell entries are estimates of factor loadings. The results are based on a confirmatory factor analysis; final model goodness of fit results follows: Costa Rica SRMR not reported because of missing values, CFI=0.97, RMSEA=0.03. Uruguay SRMR not reported because of missing values CFI=0.96, RMSEA=0.04. Data from the Americas Barometer database, 2012.

The two expected facets were, however, not found in Chile and Colombia. For these two cases, in which we cannot confirm the two-dimensional hypothesis, we perform an EFA to unveil the underlying factor structure in the data (see table 3), and subsequently a CFA to validate the identified factors. From the EFA, we retain two factors, which are the same for both cases, after being confirmed by a Parallel analysis (table 4 below, and figures A.1 and A.2 in the appendix).

**Table 3. Attitude dimensions in Chile and Colombia in 2012. Showing Factor Loadings from Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)**

			<b>A</b>	<b>B</b>	<b>Unique -ness score</b>
<b>Chile</b>	1	Willingness to pay more taxes if were used to support those who have less	0.81		0.21
	2	The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor		-0.76	0.43
	3	For each 100 (local currency) a rich and a poor person make, how much should each pay in taxes?			0.32
	4	Social policies support	0.84		0.20
	5	Inequality is a good thing because it makes poor people work harder		0.57	0.25
	6	People who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy			0.54
	7	Government's effort in reducing poverty		0.63	0.45
	8	The has always been rich and poor people and that can't be changed			0.17
		Eigenvalue:	1.41	1.72	
		Proportion of shared variance explained:	0.18	0.22	
<b>Colombia</b>	1	Willingness to pay more taxes if were used to support those who have less	0.82		0.30
	2	The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor		-0.54	0.48
	3	For each 100 (local currency) a rich and a poor person make, how much should each pay in taxes?			0.65
	4	Social policies support	0.86		0.26
	5	Inequality is a good thing because it makes poor people work harder		0.73	0.47
	6	People who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy			0.71

7	Government's effort in reducing poverty	0.63	0.55
8	The has always been rich and poor people and that can't be changed		0.52
		Eigenvalue:	1.44 1.27
		Proportion of shared variance explained:	0.19 0.16

**Table 4 . CFA Chile and Colombia (\*)**

	Chile		Colombia	
	A	B	A	B
1	Willingness to pay more taxes if were used to support those who have less			
2	The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor	0.32***		0.20***
3	For each 100 (local currency) a rich and a poor person earn, how much should each pay in taxes?			
4	Support for Social Policies			
5	Inequality is a good thing because it makes poor people work harder	-0.55***		-0.48***
6	People who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy			
7	Government's effort in reducing poverty	-0.38***		-0.26***
8	The has always been rich and poor people and that can't be changed			

Note: blanks represent abs (loading) <0.4. Data from the Americas Barometer database, 2012.  
 (\*) The structural models for testing the two factors jointly fail to converge in the two countries. Therefore, a one-factor CFA for each factor was performed for each country. Only models for factor A (composed of three items) do converge.

The best fitting CFA model for Colombia and Chile reveals a unique factor that seems to be related to sensibility toward inequality and government involvement in poverty and income redistribution (table 3) that combines three items: 2, 5 and 7.

This partial finding reveals that a bi-dimensional approach could be appropriate for analyzing support for redistribution in some countries, but it also confirms that the diversity of Latin America makes it theoretically and empirically inappropriate to assume that this framing as capable of explaining intra-regional heterogeneity.

*Income and dimensions of support for redistribution*




While Meltzer and Richard's theory is based on the individual-level assumption that self-interested support for redistribution is shaped by income, the literature also contends that 'attitudes regarding redistribution to the poor...are not consistently predicted by income' (Cavallé & Trump, 2015). In sum, self-interest attitudes towards redistribution are expected to be shaped by income because the better off can clearly identify their role as net payers, but other-regarding attitudes underlying support for redistribution are not expected to vary with individual income, as the emphasis is put on the needs of the worst-off.

In this sense, we could hypothesize that given that the bi-dimensionality found in Uruguay and Costa Rica resembles the two facets of support for redistribution found in affluent economies, at the individual level the self-interest factor should be related to income (and the poor should be more in favor of redistribution) but, at the same time, the other-regarding factor should not be shaped by income.

We find that in Uruguay both self-interest and other-regarding oriented preferences for redistribution are stratified by income quintiles, with the richer quintiles less supportive than the poorer ones in terms of the self-interest facet of redistribution, but with richer quintiles significantly more supportive than the poor in terms of other-oriented redistribution (Figure 1).

**Figure 1. Support for redistribution factors by income quintiles**



Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

In Costa Rica, neither of the two identified facets are shaped by income. In Colombia and Chile, where overall levels of support for redistribution are higher than in Costa Rica and Uruguay, there are interesting differences in how support for redistribution in the one factor available varies across income levels. While in Colombia preferences are high in relative terms and without differences across income, in Chile the higher the income the lower preferences for redistribution are.

This individual-level evidence reveals that, even when support for redistribution in less unequal contexts like Costa Rica and Uruguay may be structured similarly to what has been found in developed countries, that structure does not necessarily order individual-level preferences as predicted by the theory. The evidence from Chile and Colombia also signals that there is not necessarily congruence between how preferences are structured at the aggregate level and how they are ordered at the individual level.

## *Types*

Multinomial logit models allow us to observe the effect of each regressor on the relationship between two specific categories. Taking the category ‘egalitarian’ as a reference we are able to determine the relative probability of change between the three other ones and this one given a change of one unit in each independent variable, leaving the rest of the variables constant in their average values. We could have chosen any category in our typology as the baseline for comparison, but we choose ‘egalitarian’ because it is the category that combines high support for redistribution in terms of both self-interest and other-regarding values.

In the case of Costa Rica (table 5) a change in one level down of education (measured in quintiles) increases the probability of being ‘egoistic’ with respect to ‘egalitarian’ in 5%, while being a woman increases the probability of belonging to the former group in 11%.

When analyzing ‘libertarians’, a change in one level down of education increases the probability of belonging to this group on 7%. Also being a woman and being an active worker increases the probability of being also a ‘libertarian’ in 10% and 12% respectively.

In sum, education and sex are relevant to distinguish ‘egoistics’ and ‘libertarians’ from ‘egalitarians’. Both groups tend to be less educated and feminized than the category of reference.

‘Naïve egalitarians’ are a bit different. Being a woman increases the probability of belonging to this group (again, compared to ‘egalitarians’) in 19%, but also having a left ideology is relevant (2%) as well as being less religious (7%).

In the case of Uruguay (table 6), a change in one level down of education and a change of one point to the right (ideology) increases the probability of being an ‘egoistic’ in 9% and 5% respectively.

Libertarians present similar characteristics. A change in one level down of education and of one point to the right (ideology) increases the probability of being an ‘egoistic’ in 6% and 7% respectively. However, in this category an increase of one quintile in income increases the probability of being a ‘libertarian’ (compared to the egalitarian) in 3%. In the same vein, having a worse evaluation of the economy increases the probability of being a ‘libertarian’ in 8%.

Finally, being a woman, being working and being older increases the probability of being a ‘naïve egalitarian’ in 9%, 10% and 3%. Also, a change in income (moving to an upper quintile) increases the probability of belonging to ‘naïve egalitarians’ in 4%. Finally, a change to the right in ideology and having a worse evaluation of the economy seems to be relevant to define ‘naïve egalitarians’ increasing the probability to stay in this group by 5%.

In sum, ‘egoistics’ and ‘libertarians’ in Uruguay are less educated and more leaned to the right. The latter are also richer and unsatisfied with the economy. Women are relevant in ‘Naïve egalitarians’, which also tend to be older and active workers. Once again, ideology and the evaluation of the economy are important predictors to stay in this group.

Comparing results from both countries, sex, education and religiosity are important predictors to distinguish among types in Costa Rica. In Uruguay, by contrast, education, ideology, income and evaluation of the economy are the most relevant variables to differentiate between groups.

**Table 5. COSTA RICA: Multinomial logit models comparing each category to the ‘egalitarian’**

<b>Egoistic</b>				<b>Egalitarian</b>			
VAR	B	B/4 (Pr Cambio)	P(Z)		MEAN	MIN	MAX
Education	-0.216	-5%	0.013	Education	3.1	1	5
Sex	0.422	11%	0.061	Income	3.207101	1	5
				Area of residence	1.337278	1	2
				Age	42.65089	18	84
				Sex	0.3905325	0	1
				Ideology	5.9	1	10
				Religiosity	1.5	1	4
				Ev. Ec.	3.3	1	5
				Race	0.6	0	1
				Work	0.5	0	1
				q12r	0.7	0	1

<b>Libertarian</b>				<b>Naïve egalitarian</b>				
VAR	B	B/4 (Pr Cambio)	P(Z)	VAR	B	B/4 (Pr Cambio)	P(Z)	Mean
Education	-0.281	-7%	0.001	Sex	0.750	19%	0.001	
Sex	0.416	10%	0.063	Ideology	-0.091	-2%	0.045	
Work	0.494	12%	0.022	Religiosity	0.272	7%	0.032	

Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

**Table 6. URUGUAY: Multinomial logit models comparing each category to the ‘egalitarian’**

<b>Egoistic</b>				<b>Egalitarian</b>			
VAR	B	B/4 (Pr Cambio)	P(Z)		MEAN	MIN	MAX
Education	-0.356	-9%	0.000	Education	3.4	1	5
Ideology	0.195	5%	0.000	Income	3.1	1	5
				Area of residence	1.1	1	2
				Age	43.4	18	90
				Sex	0.5	0	1
				Ideology	3.7	1	10
				Religiosity	2.8	1	4
				Ev. Ec.	2.4	1	5
				Race	0.7	0	1
				Work	0.6	0	1
				q12r	0.7	0	1

<b>Libertarian</b>				<b>Naïve egalitarian 2</b>			
VAR	B		P(Z)	VAR	B	B/4 (Pr Cambio)	P(Z)
Education	-0.248	-6%	0.000	Income	0.153	4%	0.027
Income	0.136	3%	0.043	Age	0.010	3%	0.086
Ideology	0.290	7%	0.000	Sex	0.373	9%	0.038
Ev. Ec.	0.338	8%	0.002	Ideology	0.207	5%	0.000
				Ev. Ec.	0.194	5%	0.083
				Work	0.385	10%	0.045

Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

## 5. Concluding remarks

Our empirical analysis reveals that, as found in previous studies on Western European countries, this bi-dimensional structure is in fact present in Costa Rica and Uruguay, but does not exist in Chile and Colombia.

The fact that bi-dimensionality is confirmed in some cases but not in others could be relevant to understand why support for redistribution in the region does not fit with predominant theories in the field. Also, the fact that support for redistribution in Uruguay and Costa Rica is bi-dimensional, but that these two dimensions are absent in Chile and Colombia, suggests that levels of inequality could be related to redistributive preferences. However, the limited number of countries we have does not allow us to test this hypothesis. Further research is also needed to reveal preferences might change from uni-dimensional to bi-dimensional and, equally interesting, the other way around. This could also shed light on the role of inequality in explaining those changes.

The explorations we made using the two dimensions in the cases of Costa Rica and Uruguay reveal that income is important to shape both dimensions of preferences in the latter but not in the former. Also, while in Costa Rica the variables that are relevant to differentiate among types are sex, religiosity and education, in Uruguay only the latter is relevant, along with income, ideology and evaluation of the economy.

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## Appendix

**Table A1. Questions/sources used by the literature to measure preferences for redistribution in Latin America**

Author/publication	Question	Source
(Gaviria et al., 2007)	Do you think that reducing the differences between the rich and the poor is one of the main responsibilities of the state?	Latinobarómetro
(Alesina & Giuliano, 2009)	Do you think that what the government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about too much, the right amount or too little?	WVS
(Dion & Birchfield, 2010)	The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor (Likert scale, Strongly Disagree, Strongly Agree)	LAPOP
(Morgan & Kelly, 2010)	The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor (Likert scale, Strongly Disagree, Strongly Agree)	LAPOP
(Blofield & Luna, 2011a)	Incomes should be made more equal vs We need larger income differences as incentives  People are poor because they are lazy	World Values Survey
(Cramer & Kaufman, 2011)	In your opinion, how fair is the distribution of income in the country?	Latinobarómetro
(Roberts, 2012)	Do you believe the distribution of income in your country is just?	Latinobarómetro
(da Fonseca Silva & de Figueiredo, 2013)	In your opinion, how fair is the distribution of income in the country?  How fairly is wealth distributed in the country?	Latinobarómetro
(S. Berens, 2015b)	The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for vs people should take more responsibility to provide for themselves  We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort vs incomes should be made more equal.	World Values Survey
(S. Berens, 2015a)	The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor	LAPOP
(Carnes & Mares, 2015)	The State, rather than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for provide retirement pensions. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase?  The State, rather than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for provide health services. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this phrase?	LAPOP
(Holland, 2018)	The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor	LAPOP
(Carnes & Mares, 2016)	Do you believe that retirement pensions should be mainly in the hands of the state or mainly in the hands of private firms?	Original survey

	Support for specific social reforms (the nationalization of the private old-age funds, and the inclusion of all citizens in the public-old age fund)	
(Morgan & Kelly, 2017)	The state should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor	LAPOP
(Bogliaccini & Luna, 2019)	For each 100 [local currency] that a rich and a poor person earn, How much do you think each should pay in taxes? (1) A rich person should pay 50 [local currency]; a poor person 20 [local currency], (2) A rich person should pay 40 [local currency]; a poor person 30 [local currency], (3) A rich person should pay 30 [local currency]; a poor person 30 [local currency]?	LAPOP

**Table A2. Questions measuring two facets of support for redistribution: summary of descriptive indicators in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Uruguay**

Item	Self-interest				Other-regarding			
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	Willingness to pay more taxes if were used to support those who have less (td5)	The government should implement strong policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor (ros4)	For each 100 (local currency) a rich and a poor person make, how much should each pay in taxes? (soc1r)	Social policies support (socialpolicy)	Inequality is a good thing because it makes poor people work harder (td2)	People who get help from government social assistance programs are lazy (cct3)	Government's effort in reducing poverty (n1)	The has always been rich and poor people and that can't be changed (td1)
MEAN								
Chile	3,6	5,98	1,64	0,70	3,20	4,26	3,66	4,75
Colombia	3,34	5,87	1,45	0,88	3,26	3,74	3,40	4,88
Costa Rica	3,66	5,71	1,54	1,13	3,93	3,81	3,18	5,48
Uruguay	3,67	6,12	1,23	1,53	3,28	4,45	4,63	5,02
STDV								
Chile	2,44	1,26	0,68	1,03	1,89	1,78	1,60	2,04
Colombia	2,21	1,46	0,79	1,11	1,95	1,2	1,56	1,91
Costa Rica	2,46	1,68	0,77	1,22	2,33	2,09	1,67	2,03
Uruguay	2,44	1,45	0,90	1,28	2,31	2,17	1,77	2,20

Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.


Note: td5 varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being the lowest willingness to pay more taxes and 7 the highest; ros4 varies from 1 to 7, with 1 being complete disagreement with the statement and 7 complete agreement, soc1r varies from 0 to 2, with 0 being the answer “the rich should pay 30 and the poor 30”, 1 “the rich should pay 40 and the poor 30”, and 2 “The rich should pay 50 and the poor 20”; socialpolicy varies from 0 to 3, with 0 being less support for social policy expenditure and 3 more support for social policy; td2, cct3, n1 and td1 vary from 1 to 7, with 1 being complete disagreement with the statement and 7 complete agreement.

**Table A.3. Independent variables**

**(To be included)**




Figure A1. Horn's Parallel Analysis for Chile




Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

Figure A2. Horn's Parallel Analysis for Colombia




Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

Figure A3. COSTA RICA: Self-interested support for redistribution




Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

Figure A4. COSTA RICA: Other-regarding support for redistribution




Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

Figure A5. URUGUAY: Self-interested support for redistribution




Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

Figure A6. URUGUAY: Other-regarding support for redistribution



Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

Figure A.7. COSTA RICA: Self-interest and other regarding support for redistribution factors



Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.

Figure A.8. URUGUAY: Self-interest and other regarding support for redistribution factors



Source: Own elaboration based on LAPOP 2012 data.